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ABSTRACT
An age and sex structured matrix population model is developed to simulate pop-
ulation dynamics of a trophy hunted polygynous species. The model is used to
project population growth rate and abundance of a trophy hunted ungulate species,
Capra falconeri, found in the western regions of Pakistan. The impact of harvest
(hunting) the species on population dynamics is simulated to assess whether a
trophy-hunting program, targeting mature adult males, is sustainable. In the con-
text of projected growth rate and projected abundance, the program is found to be
sustainable for harvest rates as high as ninety percent of the ≥ 6 year old male pop-
ulation. However, other ecological considerations, such as biased sex-ratios, and
deterioration in quality of the gene pool prevent such high harvest rates. In view
of the sustainability of the program, different delivery mechanisms (or marketing
techniques) for sale of hunting permits are assessed to determine the optimal mech-
anism. In the presence of complete information this turns out to be perfect price
discrimination, with a revenue maximizing quota determined by the price elasticity
of demand (η). That is, a larger quota if η > 1, and a smaller quota if η < 1, will
maximize revenue. In the more likely scenario of incomplete information however,
priority pricing (a form of third degree price discrimination) or second-price sealed
bid auctions are found to maximize the seller’s expected revenues, as opposed to
the existing first-price sealed-bid auction .
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To my children and their generation, and to the hope that my generation leaves a
better world for you to experience and enjoy. And to the Markhor, may you
flourish, so generations to come may enjoy your beauty and grace.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Humans live off the land and seas, using wild animals, plants, and their prod-
ucts for purposes ranging from food to medicines, shelter, and fiber. In a world
that seems intent on liquidating natural resources however, over-exploitation has
become the second most important threat, after habitat loss and degradation, to
the survival of the world’s birds, mammals, and plants. Over-exploitation involves
the unsustainable use of the components of biological diversity. The motivations
for such use are as varied as the plants and animals that are taken, ranging from
subsistence hunting and fishing, to recreational and economic pursuits carried out
by wealthy individuals and corporations (Groom et al., 2006).
Sustainable use, on the other hand, is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), as “the use of components of biological diversity in a
way and at a rate that does not lead to the decline of biological diversity, thereby
maintaining its potential to meet the needs of current and future generations”
(Multilateral, 1993).
The idea of sustainable use is viewed by some conservationists as an unwelcome
challenge, to be avoided by establishing more protected areas and by promoting
non-extractive tourism (Soule and Sanjayan, 1998; Kramer et al., 1997). Oth-
ers however, recognize that such approaches are of little direct value to all but
a privileged few, and particularly unjust for the rural poor in many parts of the
developing world (Hutton, 2004; Knudsen, 1999). This dichotomy is largely as a
result of confusing “preservation” with “conservation”. The two are not the same
thing; preservation is an extreme form of conservation - but with no “use” in-
tended (Cooch, 2007). It is essential to recognize that in most cases conservation
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will have to be achieved through co-operation in human social space. Thus, the
term incentive-driven conservation has been suggested for cases where the sustain-
able use of exploited species generates livelihood benefits that in turn act as the
incentives for the delivery of effective conservation (Hutton and Leader-Williams,
2003).
Incentives can take many forms. They may be social or financial. They may be
positive or negative, where benefits or penalties, respectively, result from particular
actions. In the industrialized world negative incentives based on regulation and
enforcement are common, as are positive (and often perverse) incentives based on
financial inducements in the form of subsidies or tax breaks. It is important to
note that incentives can flow from both extractive and non-extractive uses. In the
developed world, the benefits flowing from non-extractive uses, notably tourism
and wildlife viewing, are often as significant as those from extractive uses, if not
more so.
In the developing world however, the situation is often very different. Here neg-
ative incentives are not uncommon, but their successful implementation is more
elusive and the state is rarely in a position to provide significant financial induce-
ments for conservation. As a result, successful conservation is forced to rely heavily
on the incentives generated by use for a whole raft of reasons often including a lack
of accessibility, political stability, infrastructure, and charismatic species (Leader-
Williams, 2002; Leader-Williams and Hutton, 2005). Experience with conservation
programs has shown that some forms of extractive use, if well managed, properly
monitored and based on an understanding of biological limits to sustainable use,
can generate significant funds, and provide positive incentives to drive habitat and
species conservation. These incentives can take the form of significant livelihood
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benefits for the rural poor who live side by side with the exploited species and on
whom these species ultimately depend for their continued survival. Furthermore,
such forms of use can also be one of the few options for realizing the value of remote
or low visibility ecosystems where other forms of tourism are not viable for lack of
infrastructure or political stability (Hutton, 2004).
The alternative is unsustainable use and ecological degradation of natural habi-
tats that is all too often associated with deteriorating livelihoods and human wel-
fare.
1.1 Trophy Hunting as a Positive Incentive
One specific form of incentive driven conservation that has gained popularity in
recent years is trophy hunting, ie, the selective hunting (or harvest) of wild game
(usually male) for sport, where the skin, antlers, and/or head are kept as a trophy
or memorial. Evidence of revenues generated by the trophy hunting industry in
Africa provides economic justification for wildlife as a land use over vast areas
(Lindsey et al., 2006). Additionally, trophy hunting has the potential for generat-
ing substantial funds that can be used for conservation activities such as habitat
protection, law enforcement, and research and monitoring. More importantly, the
revenues from trophy hunting are said to provide a strong incentive for conser-
vation and habitat protection by demonstrating the economic worth of wildlife
to local people (Shackelton, 2001). Opinion among conservationists concerning
trophy hunting however, is polarized, ranging from absolute opposition by protec-
tionists to those who see trophy hunting as a practical means of creating incentives
for conservation (Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003).
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Resistance to the idea of killing animals for sport is founded on ethical issues,
equity issues in the distribution of hunting revenues, inadequate involvement of
communities, corruption, and ecological problems such as setting quotas in the
absence of adequate population data, and overshooting of quotas.
Researchers however, have also documented the positive aspects of trophy hunt-
ing as a conservation tool including a low off-take rate and a focus on males (typ-
ically 2 percent of male populations), both of which do not generally jeopardize
wildlife populations, and also mean that trophy hunting can play a role in en-
dangered species conservation (Lindsey et al., 2006). Trophy hunters also tend
to pay higher fees per client than conventional tourists (Lewis and Alpert, 1997).
Advocates also point out that trophy hunting generates revenues for conservation
in areas that may not be suitable for tourism, such as those lacking attractive
scenery or high wildlife densities (Leader-Williams and Hutton, 2005). Addition-
ally, trophy hunters may also be less easily dissuaded than conventional tourists
from visiting countries experiencing political instability or lack of infrastructure
(Leader-Williams and Hutton, 2005). Thus, if properly managed and monitored,
it has the potential to ease pressure on wildlife by reducing poaching and prevent-
ing conversion of land to agricultural and other uses.
1.2 Modeling
To some degree, it is a fairly recent observation that wildlife is a renewable resource
that with management can exist over the long-term. With the advent of “harder
science”, managers have increased the sophistication with which they tackle the
problem (Eppink and van den Bergh, 2007). The biological theory of sustainable
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exploitation is firmly rooted in the field of population ecology, which seeks to un-
derstand the responses of populations to increased mortality of individuals through
density-dependent compensation. This theory has produced a range of methods
and models for estimating sustainable limits of exploitation from simple rules of
thumb based on life histories to highly sophisticated models (Groom et al., 2006).
These models are usually dynamic, and the simpler models may take the form
of linear, logistic, or sigmoid growth functions, among others, that give changes
in abundance over time subject to growth and/or density dependent parameters.
More sophisticated methods include projections based on matrix, capture mark
recapture, or genetic methods.
The study of population dynamics is, in simplest terms, the study of changes in
abundance (N). In other words, population dynamics is the study of ∆N. Further,
change in abundance is simply the difference between the number of individuals
entering a population and those leaving a population. ∆N = “births” - “deaths”.
Whenever the number of additions is greater than the number of departures then
∆N will be greater than 0, (ie, the population grows). Arrivals can mean new births
or immigration into the population. Departures can be by means of death and
emigration. Thus, ∆N = (“births” + “immigrants”) - (“deaths” + “emigrants”).
Population dynamics is more or less defined by this equation.
Most studies using dynamic models include only one sex, usually the female,
under the assumptions that the sexes are identical or that the population dynamics
are determined by one sex only. Sexual dimorphism in vital rates, such as mor-
tality, age to maturity, and fecundity is well documented in many species; neither
assumption therefore is generally valid. Two-sex population projection models
were proposed as long ago as 1986 by Caswell and Weeks (Caswell and Weeks,
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1986). To the extent that both males and females are required for reproduction,
population demography is nonlinear. Very few studies have used two-sex mod-
els explicitly since they were first proposed however, primarily due to a lack of
detailed information required by such models. According to Rankin and Kokko
(2007), males can have a diverse range of effects on models of population density,
thus the importance of males is not limited to only conservation action, but also
to pest control and management of invasive species. Additionally, though one-sex
models of population dynamics are highly competent at describing population dy-
namics, Rankin and Kokko (2007) state that we can expect surprising deviations
from those predicted if male dependence of population dynamics has not been in-
corporated in the dynamical explanation. They go one to state that “empirically
derived graphs depicting changes in population growth (or more explicitly still,
changes in the numbers of females and males separately) at various male and fe-
male densities would be a welcome sight in the literature”. As a result, rather
than just looking at per female productivity, Rankin and Kokko (2007) strongly
advocate investigating the role of males on population dynamics in a population
setting.
Furthermore, incorporating economics in such models is imperative to make
them politically acceptable. Economists are pre-eminently equipped to analyze
this issue, but only if they incorporate appropriate biological indicators and related
ecological theories in their models (Eppink and van den Bergh, 2007). Economic
models with a biological component are frequently referred to as bio-economic
models, and fall in to four main categories, ie, cost-effectivness, macroeconomic
growth, general equilibrium, and renewable resource models. Criticisms, from a
biological perspective, of bio-economic models generally refer to oversimplification
of biological processes. Failure to account for ecological complexity therefore, is
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said to bias conclusions in favor of political or economic objectives.
It is easy to recommend incorporating more ecological complexity in bio-
economic models, but is fair to add a disadvantage; namely that theoretical, an-
alytical solutions will often become impossible. Fortunately, numerical solutions
will always be possible. Milner et al. (2007) suggest that in order to make firmer
predictions about the effects on population growth and viability, both large-scale
empirical manipulations of harvesting regimes and theoretical studies, including
simulation modeling, are urgently needed. It has been suggested that perhaps
this is the way the go for this type of research, since there is a trade-off between
ecological relevance and analytical tractability (Eppink and van den Bergh, 2007).
1.3 Delivery Mechanism
In Pakistan, a central authority (the National Council for the Conservation of
Wildlife), determines annual quota allocations of hunting permits, for areas in
which the Markhor is found. The existing quota for the population in Balochistan
is five, which is an increase, based on increased population numbers, from just
two in years before 2004. Once the quota is allocated, the provincial wildlife
department issues a call for sealed-bids for the permits by advertising in national
and international newspapers. The reservation price (the price below which a
permit will not be sold) is currently set at USD50,000, an increase, based on
higher perceived demand, from USD25,000 before 2006.
The hunts are usually arranged by a local outfitter, who arranges the hunter’s
acquisition of the permit (the hunter has to be present in person to actually receive
the permit however), local travel and accommodations, trackers and guides, and
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the export license if the hunt is successful. If the hunt is unsuccessful because of
the absence of a trophy she is given the option of a refund or a return visit the
following year. If however the hunt is unsuccessful because she missed his shot,
she is not refunded the money.
The existing delivery mechanism for the sale of permits is a first-price sealed-bid
auction.
1.4 Objectives
The main objective of this paper is to model and simulate two-sex population
dynamics with harvest in order to assess the conditions under which harvest might
be biologically sustainable. To do this, a detailed matrix population growth model
(based on methods developed by Leslie, Lotka, Volterra, and most recently by
Caswell (Caswell, 2001)) is formulated that can track and project the population
(abundance) into the future accounting for positive and negative shocks such as
harvesting.
An very simple economic component is then added to this model to link quota
allocation decisions, derived assuming third-degree monopoly pricing (perfectly
discriminating monopolist), to species numbers and growth rates. In addition, to
this simple economic analysis, recommendations on the optimal marketing scheme
1 (or delivery mechanism) for sale of hunting permits are made.
The main questions I hope to answer are:
1. Are current recommendations of a 2 to 5 percent offtake biologically sustain-
1Defined as one which maximizes the seller’s expected revenues.
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able?
2. Is targeting a specific age or sex class biologically sustainable?
3. What combination of permit price and quota allocation maximizes revenue,
and under what conditions?
4. What is the optimal delivery mechanism for the sale of hunting permits?
It is hoped that the methods and model developed in this paper may be used
by planners and managers as a framework to make quota allocation decisions, and
market them using optimal delivery mechanism, while maintaining sustainable
harvest programs. It is also hoped, in light of the research and recommendations
of Rankin and Kokko (2007), that the model developed here and the results of the
simulation can be applied more generally to study the dynamics of other species for
which “males matter”, particularly when thinking about conservation or biological
control programmes.
It is important to note that this paper is not a comment on the ethics or even
a justification for trophy hunting. It is however, a recognition of a practice that
exists in many parts of the world and is therefore, an attempt at contributing to its
scientific foundations, in addition to adding to the literature on two-sex population
dynamics.
1.5 Organization
Chapter 2 reviews literature related to trophy hunting and the use of bio-economic
models. In addition, some of the two-sex matrix population projection literature
is also reviewed.
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Chapter 3 then presents the development of the actual model. It begins with
explaining the formulation of projection matrices from a basic life cycle graph
(LCG), before delving in to more complex two-sex matrix models. The chapter
ends with development of a two-sex matrix population model for a species subjected
to harvest. A linear demand function relating permit prices to numbers of permits
issued (in effect quotas for harvest) is also incorporated to study the revenues
generated under various harvest scenarios.
Chapter 4 then demonstrates the use of the model as it applies to a trophy
hunted species of Markhor (Capra falconeri) in Pakistan.
Chapter 5 reviews literature related to auction theory and monopoly pricing
in the context of the existing delivery mechanism. After assessing whether the
first-price sealed bid auction is optimal, it concludes that it is not and ends with
recommendations for alternate delivery mechanisms that are optimal.
The thesis ends with conclusions in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Trophy Hunting
Commercial and sport hunting are economically significant activities in many de-
veloped countries. 33,000 jobs in the United Kingdom depend on hunting for
example. Sealing and whaling used to provide jobs for Norwegian and Cana-
dian mariners and hunters, who suffered economic loss when these activities were
banned. In New-Zealand, recreational hunting and trout and big game fishing gen-
erate several thousand full and part-time jobs, and possum hunting and trapping
used to be economically significant in some areas before the successful campaign
against fur in Europe and North America. However, the economies of rich coun-
tries do not depend significantly on hunting and if it was banned, recreational
hunters would simply switch their discretionary spending, thus creating jobs in
other sectors of the economy.
The situation is quite different in poorer countries, where wildlife has always
been used as a resource and “Use or non-use is not the issue; sustainable use
is” (Gunn, 2001). The colonial powers, after reducing many species to rarity or
extinction, generally adopted policies of strict preservation of wildlife. This was
done without regard to the needs of local people who were regarded as poachers
even when they engaged in traditional subsistence hunting. Less attention is given
to the fact that they have few, if any, alternative options to using the available
wild resources. The forced abandonment of homes and fields because crops are
destroyed by wildlife adds further strain to the relationship between people and
wildlife (see Gunn, 2001; MacDonald, 2005; Knudsen, 1999).
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Trophy hunting as it exists today is largely an international activity. This
internationalization of hunting does not happen without a demand for hunting op-
portunities on the part of wealthy foreign hunters, a demand grounded, at least in
part, in the rise of environmentalism and conceptions of public good that challenge
the activities of hunters closer to home. In North America, for example, partic-
ipation in hunting has declined over the past 25 years. The reasons for this are
multiple but can be loosely tied to a rising appreciation of the rights of non-human
species. International trophy hunting, however, is on the increase, and this is re-
flected in a 71 per cent increase in the importation of foreign game killed by US
trophy hunters since 1990 (MacDonald, 2005). No doubt this is fueled by exoticism
and the status derived from the sanctioned rewards of the hunting community, but
it is partially also a flight from opposition. As trophy hunting faces increased op-
position in North America and Europe, and as opportunities to hunt encounter
increased restrictions, hunters, like multinational industries, flee to grounds where
they can escape those restrictive conditions.
From a “community” perspective, at least one motivation for them to partici-
pate in trophy hunting programs is the chance to acquire the cash through which
they may realize the long-promised material benefits of development. In essence,
the implementation of sport trophy hunting provides the means for converting
wildlife to a commodity with exchange value outside the community. Wildlife,
then, becomes a source of direct income that can be used to acquire some desired
benefits such as increased household income and the development of infrastruc-
ture. It is the promise of these benefits that is meant to provide villagers with a
disincentive to engage in hunting. Increased household income or the benefits of
social or physical infrastructure are taken as a measure of increased development
so that wildlife, as commodity, becomes one basis of community development. Of
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course, this logic is grounded in inequity, and only works where there is a vast
difference in the material conditions of those providing access to wildlife and those
paying for the experience of the hunt (MacDonald, 2005).
2.1.1 Positive Aspects
Poor countries gain considerable revenue from trophy hunting. The impoverished
Mongolian government used to charge $10,000 for a permit to shoot a snow leopard
before its hunting was banned, and a 16-day hunt with one snow leopard used to
cost $25,000 per person; any wolves shot along the way were thrown in for $600.
Bulgarian dealers sell falcons in the West for $10,000. Orangutan were sold in
Taiwan in the 1980s at $30,000 each, though the local traders in Indonesia received
less than $200 each for themstill a very considerable sum by local standards (Gunn,
2001). None of these cases is part of a sustainable management program, but other
countries which manage their wildlife effectively have achieved substantial revenues
from trophy hunting while maintaining or increasing their wildlife populations.
Perhaps the largest scale on which trophy hunting is practiced is in the African
continent. During the 1980s and 1990s, the potential for trophy hunting revenues
to promote conservation was increasingly acknowledged (Lindsey et al., 2007). In
several African countries, there was a gradual alignment of trophy hunting indus-
tries with conservation and development policies, supported by a number of in-
ternational donor agencies. This happened first in southern Africa (eg, as part of
the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMP-
FIRE) program in Zimbabwe and Administrative Management Design program in
Zambia), then in Central Africa (eg, through the Programme de Dveloppement des
Zones de Chasse Villagesoise in Central African Republic and Zones dIntrt Cyn-
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gtique Gestion Communautaire in Cameroon), and more recently in West Africa
(eg, through Gestion Participative des Ressources Naturelles et de la Faune, and
Ecosystmes Protgs dAfrique Soudano-Sahlienne).
Lindsey et al. (2007) provide a review of the scale of the African trophy hunting
industry, and assess both positive and negative issues relating to hunting and
conservation in Africa. Trophy hunting occurs in 23 countries in Africa, with the
largest industries occurring in southern Africa and Tanzania, where the industry
is expanding. Using the most recent estimates for the countries with significant
hunting industries, where estimates are available, Lindsey et al. (2007) estimate
that trophy hunting generates gross revenues of at least US $201 million per year
in sub-Saharan Africa: from a minimum of 18,500 clients (see Lindsey et al., 2007,
Table 1). Over 1,394,000 square kilometers is used for hunting in sub-Saharan
Africa, exceeding the area encompassed by national parks by 22 percent in the
countries where hunting is permitted.
Country specific examples of trophy hunting progrmas include that of Tanzania
for which hunting licenses alone yielded $4.5 million in 1990. Sports hunters who
wish to hunt lion in Tanzania are required to stay for 21 days and on average spent
$35,000. Before Kenya imposed a ban on hunting, the total revenue from sport
hunting contributed about 6.5 percent to the total foreign exchange from tourism.
At Phinda Izilwane Park in Kwa-Zulu, South Africa, hunters pay $30,000 to shoot
a white rhino. In Malawi, rural communities derive 2.5 times more cash from
wildlife than the market value of their subsistence agricultural products (Gunn,
2001).
Perhaps one of the most well know trophy hunting programs is the CAMP-
FIRE program in Zimbabwe, which was set up by the Zimbabwean Department of
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National Parks and Wildlife Management in 1986, with the support of the World-
wide Fund for Nature, the Office of USAID, Harare, and the Centre for Applied
Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe. Over five million people almost half
the populationlive in communal areas, which make up 42 percent of the country.
Communities may decide to participate in CAMPFIRE, which around half had
done in August 1996.
In 1995, CAMPFIRE generated $2.5 million, a substantial sum given that
game wardens are paid as little as $80 per month. This revenue is gained from
hunting safaris, tourism such as photographic safaris, sales of products such as
animal products and crocodile eggs (for sale to crocodile farmers), and rafting
licenses. Around 90 percent of the revenue is generated from the sale of big game
hunting licenses, and 64 percent of this is derived from elephant trophy hunting
licenses which in March 1996 cost $9,000. Over the period 198993, 22 percent
of revenue was reinvested in wildlife management and 54 percent devolved to the
participating communities on the communal lands. Communities spent their shares
on infrastructure development such as water supply, clinic and school development,
farm fencing (to keep out crop-destroying elephants, hippos, buffalo, and kudu)
and roading, income generating projects, and cash distributions to families for
their own use. In some areas, this income amounts to 50 percent of a households
annual income and enables families to pay for items such as school fees.
Masoka Ward, a formerly impoverished area, earned $100,000 in 1994 from
a safari hunting concession organized through CAMPFIRE. The ward used the
money to build a health clinic, pay game guards, and fund a football team, and
each of the 140 households also received more than four times their annual income
for drought relief, either in cash or maize. This revenue, of course, would not be
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available without the sale of hunting licences. It would be even greater were it not
for the ban on international trade in elephant products under the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species and their Products (CITES) since 1990
(Gunn, 2001).
Whereas the total population of African elephants fell by half between 1975
and 1990 (from 160,000 to 16,000 in Kenya), Zimbabwe’s elephants have increased
steadily-32,000 in 1960, 52,000 in 1989, and over 70, 000 in 1993. Though more
recent estimates are not available due to the political and security situation in
the country, it is thought that the population has continued to grow since then.
The national trophy off-take is restricted to no more than 0.7 percent per year,
which is clearly sustainable. Because they have a stake in sustaining populations
of economically valuable game animals, Zimbabweans have a commitment to con-
servation. As a result, species such as elephants which are rare or extinct in many
other countries are thriving in Zimbabwe, along with populations of other animals
which benefit from protection of big game habitat (Gunn, 2001).
In Pakistan trophy hunting in its present form is a collection of several such
hunting programs that were initially started independently of each other (impor-
tantly they were not initially community based) and brought under the commu-
nity based trophy hunting program umbrella in 1999. The earliest instance was
launched by the NWFP Wildlife Department in 1983 as the ’Chitral Conservation
Hunting Program’, a trophy-hunting program for Markhor. The program lasted
eight years until the government banned the export of trophies along with all big
game hunting throughout Pakistan in 1991. From 1983 to 1991, hunters from
Safari Club International paid a total of $250,000 in trophy fees, which were de-
posited in a special account of the NWFP Wildlife Department for a while and
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later deposited in the national exchequer. The program was revived in 1995 as
part of the Community Based Trophy Hunting Program, where a conservative 2
percent of males older than 6 years are harvested, and has generated $0.8 mil-
lion in revenue since then. The longest running purely Community Based Trophy
Hunting Program is the Torghar Conservation Project (TCP) established in 1984.
This project was initiated by the tribal leaders in the Torghar Hills of Baluchistan
province with the help of wildlife biologists from the US Fish and Wildlife Service.
In 1994, TCP was formalized as a registered NGO - the Society for Torghar En-
vironmental Protection (STEP), and until 2000 had generated over $1 million in
revenue (Frisina, 2000).
Lindsey et al. (2007) also cite numerous other studies which show that where
well managed (as in some southern African states), trophy hunting involves low off-
takes and is sustainable. Low off-takes and high prices mean that trophy hunting
can play a role in creating incentives for the conservation of threatened and endan-
gered species. Trophy hunters pay higher fees per client than conventional tourists
and so revenues can be generated from lower volumes of people, resulting in poten-
tially lower environmental impacts (Lewis and Alpert, 1997). Significantly, trophy
hunting generates revenues for conservation in areas which may not be suitable
for tourism, including some countries experiencing political instability. Lindsey
et al. (2007) conclude that trophy hunting is therefore, of major importance to
conservation in Africa by creating economic incentives for conservation over vast
areas, including areas which may be unsuitable for alternative wildlife-based land
uses such as photographic eco-tourism (see Lindsey et al., 2006, 2007; Hutton and
Leader-Williams, 2003; Hutton, 2004; Knudsen, 1999).
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2.1.2 Negative Aspects
There are, however, a number of well publicized problems associated with trophy
hunting which limit the extent to which the industry contributes to conservation
objectives. These include ethical, biological and social problems (Lindsey et al.,
2006). Meanwhile, animal rights and welfare groups oppose hunting due to a
fundamental rejection of the concept of killing animals for sport Lindsey et al.
(2007); Gunn (2001). Discussion concerning trophy hunting is polarized, with
animal rights groups and protectionists on one side, and hunters and pragmatic
conservationists on the other (Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003; Lindsey et al.,
2007). This polarisation is exacerbated by a lack of reliable data on the impact
of trophy hunting on wildlife conservation. Most information on trophy hunting
occurs in unpublished grey literature, and discussion of hunting in the popular
media is sometimes emotive. Lindsey et al. (2006) also report that “in South
African game ranching areas, the high value of wildlife as trophies has encouraged
the division of large areas into small blocks surrounded by game-proof, where non-
huntable predators are persecuted because they prey on trophy species”.
Lately, the negative evolutionary consequences of trophy hunting have also be-
gun to be documented. Some researchers (Coltman et al., 2003; Whitfield, 2003)
report that horn sizes and body weight of a certain species of ungulate has de-
creased over the years because hunters have targeted the largest trophies they
could find. But scientists carrying out these studies did not call for a cessation
of hunting; instead they recommended a change in regulations to prevent hunters
taking the largest animals. Shackelton (2001) states “evidence suggests that in the
short term, there are few if any negative effects of trophy hunting. This is to be
expected, at least where the majority of mature males are not hunted. What is
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unknown however, is the long-term genetic impact of this activity, because trophy
hunting removes what are most probably the genetically superior individuals from
a population”. Again, the impact will likely be minimized if only a fraction of the
mature trophy males are taken each year. Shackelton does admit however, that
there is no data to support this supposition.
Conclusions on the demogrphic side effects of trophy hunting are equivocal.
(Singer and Zeigenfuss, 2002) for example, report that horn size and mating be-
havior have no effect on surviorship except in heavily hunted populations. For
hunted rams at least they also concluded that trophy hunting decreased compe-
tition between rams for obtaining copulations, and likely altered dominance hi-
erarchies of rams, natural selection for largest-horned rams, and potentially the
genetic composition of populations. Trophy hunting might select for phenotypes
of largest-horned rams, and those largest-horned rams may have higher heterozy-
gosity or specific genetic backgrounds that contribute to more rapid rates of horn
growth. Conversely, trophy hunting permits more subdominant and smaller-horned
rams to obtain copulations, and thus may increase the ratio of effective population
size to census population size and thus increase total genetic diversity.
Milner et al. (2007) also report on the demographic side effects of trophy hunt-
ing and conclude that though the mechanisms by which selective harvesting could
affect population demography are relatively well documented, the extent to which
they affect population growth is still poorly understood. However, because many
of these effects are likely to act additively, they may nonetheless reduce the pop-
ulation growth rate more than first anticipated. Milner et al. (2007) suggest that
though good estimates are lacking for many parameters, conceptual models would
be helpful in assessing when demographic side effects might start to limit popula-
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tion growth and in guiding empirical data collection.
As the world’s population continues to grow, and habitat shrinks, pressure on
wildlife will increase. Inhabitants of developing countries, like Western environ-
mentalists, are entitled to a materially adequate standard of life. They cannot and
should not be expected to protect wildlife if it is against their interests to do so.
The only feasible strategy to protect the interests of both wildlife and people is
one that integrates conservation and development, as in Zimbabwe. Gunn (2001)
states that “whatever we may think of trophy hunting, at present it is a necessary
part of wildlife conservation in many parts of the world”.
2.2 Bio-economic Models
Models are important tools in the development of management recommendations
for the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity (in short biodiversity man-
agement). They are used both in ecological and economic research. In ecology,
models are used to analyze how biodiversity management affects the dynamics and
functioning of ecosystems. However, the usefulness of these models for policy ad-
vice is limited, because they do not address the socioeconomic dimensions of the
problem, including economic, institutional, and political aspects. These issues are
actual topics of economic research and modeling. Many economic models are, how-
ever, also deficient, when they contain oversimplified assumptions on the ecological
effects of conservation or do not represent current ecological knowledge. The ob-
servation that disciplinary models exhibit complementary limitations leads to the
simple conclusion that it is beneficial to merge ecological and economic knowledge
via ecologicaleconomic models (Watzold and Drechsler, 2007).
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Recently, Eppink and van den Bergh (2007) evaluated how well environmental-
economic models describe biodiversity loss and conservation issues. Four types of
economic models turn out to dominate economic research into biodiversity conser-
vation: cost-effectiveness models, renewable resource extraction models, macroe-
conomic growth models with natural resources, and general equilibrium models
with natural resource externalities. Eppink and van den Bergh (2007) assessed the
advantages and disadvantages of each modeling approach and presented recom-
mendations for improvement. Their analysis however, was based on biodiversity
as a whole and not on specific species, for which the renewable resource extraction
models outperform the other three.
Renewable resource extraction models reflect that a species’ population may
have economic value, particularly when harvested. This idea was first applied to
fisheries (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1954). Clark (1973) extended and popularized
its use and showed that extinction is optimal if a species is unable to generate
a competitive return that is determined by economic and biological parameters
(see also Clark and Munro, 1975). The Clark (1973) model, and the extensions
provided in Clark et al. (1979) and in Conrad (1999) illustrate an approach for de-
riving sustainable harvesting rates, with the latter utilizing a spreadsheet modeling
approach.
Johannesen (2006) presents a bioeconomic model in order to compare the per-
formance of an ICDP based on a link between the benefit transfers and the con-
servation objective, with an ICDP based on unconditional transfers. The model
however, is static and involves one agent, namely the local people. Hence, the
model analyses solely how the local people respond to ICDP benefits, and ignores
any dynamic interaction between the local people, the ICDP manager, and the
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wildlife species.
Bulte (2003) focuses on differences between poaching and conservation of dif-
ferent species. Bulte and Horan (2003) develop a model of open-access wildlife
exploitation, habitat conservation, and agriculture, in which farmers may either
hunt for wildlife or grow crops. They show that increasing wildlife conservation
may well be pareto-superior to equilibria in which agriculture dominates. Kinyua
et al. (2000) also deal with wildlife management but focus more on the compe-
tition between wildlife and grazing and, in particular, on the incentives for large
commercial ranchers.
Skonhoft (1998) considered the impact of different property-sharing regimes on
the incentives of the park manager and on the welfare of the communities. He
modeled a single interaction between wildlife and the community, in the form of
intrusions; the park manager’s incentives derived from the relative marginal values
of tourism and hunting. Johannesen and Skonhoft (2005) present a nash game in
which both the communities and the park manager choose harvesting effort, as
opposed to off-take, in a form of duopoly competition. Within a Gordon-Schfer-
type model, their paper focuses on the strategic interaction between the manager of
a protected area and a group of local people living near the park. The park manager
benefits from wildlife through non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting and
local people benefit through hunting but they also bear costs as wildlife causes
agricultural damage. Depending on the economic and ecological environment,
they show that ICDPs relying on money transfers to the local people derived from
the park manager’s activities may or may not promote wildlife conservation and
the effects on the welfare of the local people are ambiguous.
Analysing structured wildlife harvesting models, ie, models where the species
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is grouped in different classes according to age and sex, has a long tradition within
biology. Caswell (2001) gives a recent in-depth overview (see also Getz and Haigh,
1989). However, economic analysis plays only a minor role in these books. Eco-
nomic analysis is introduced more explicitly in Cooper (1993) who formulates a
simulation model that finds the economically optimal level of deer tags for hunting
zones and where the deer population is structured in bucks and does.
Skonhoft et al. (2002) analyze various management strategies for a mountain
ungulate living in a protected area and a hunting area. Clark and Tait (1982) who
studied the optimal harvest value in a sex selective harvesting model and where
the population hence was grouped in two stages, meat value maximisation. See
also the two stage seal model in Conrad and Bjorndal (1991).
Also relevant to my research is the growing literature on the optimal manage-
ment of multi-use species, in which wildlife is both a resource and a pest, such
as Zivin, Hueth, and Zilberman (Zivin et al.), Rondeau (2001), and Rondeau and
Conrad (2003). Most recently, Horan and Bulte (2004) consider optimal manage-
ment in the presence of second-best trade restrictions. They found the shadow
value of wildlife to the community may be negative or positive, which can create
certain complications. The focus on optimal wildlife management by a single plan-
ner is obviously appropriate for the case of private landowners in North America
(struggling with migrating beavers or feral pigs) or local governments trying to
deal with an exploding deer population. But the set-up may be less applicable
to the context of developing countries where nuisance species often pose greater
burdens upon farmers than in developed countries, and where property rights to
many wildlife species are typically imperfectly enforced.
Recently, there has been a strong emphasis on bio-economic models with spatial
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distribution as a key element, in most instances formulated within the context of
marine reserves (Conrad, 1999; Sanchirico and Wilen, 2005). These models have,
among others, analyzed under what ecological and economic conditions, and to
what extent, marine reserve creation may increase aggregate biomass and change
the profitability of a fishery. A somewhat different type of study is Skonhoft et al.
(2002), who analyze the optimal management of a chamois population moving
between a protected area and a surrounding hunting area.
Perhaps the most relevant article for my research is that by Bradshaw and
Brook (2007), who analyze the ecological and economic costs/benefits of a series
of potential harvest management options for Australia’s banteng (Bos javanicus)
population, with the aim being either to: (1) maximize sustainable yield (MSY);
(2) maximize harvest of trophy males; (3) maximize indigenous off-take; (4) sup-
press density or completely eradicate the population; (5) minimize risk of extinction
whilst limiting range expansion; (6) scenarios incorporating two or more of options.
Their modeling framework employed stochastic, density-regulated two-sex matrix
population models. For each management option, they present a simple economic
analysis that incorporates estimated costs of management implementation and as-
sociated profits projected. Results demonstrate that revenues of >AU$200,000 is
possible from meat production and safari hunting without compromising long-term
population stability or the conservation status of this endangered bovid.
2.2.1 Two-sex Dynamics
The majority of population dynamical models only view the population from the
female point of view (Caswell, 2001). This assumption makes life rather simple, and
allows for mathematical tractability in more complicated models of populations.
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The logic behind the assumption is that males will be born and die at the same
rate as females. This means that the sex ratio is always even, and the female
density therefore constitutes half of the total population density. The assumptions
used in single-sex models hold under limited conditions, where models assume
that male availability does not limit female reproduction, the sex-ratio is even,
and male life history does not differ from that of females (Caswell and Weeks,
1986; Lindstrom and Kokko, 1998). If such assumptions are fulfilled, a model
incorporating two sexes will always produce a total population that is twice the
number of females, rendering the explicit incorporation of males unnecessary. If
the presence and behavior of males does have a discernible influence on population
equilibria or stability, one-sex population models should be abandoned in favor of
two-sex models, particularly when thinking about conservation or biological control
programmes. It is now increasingly recognized that the presence and behavior of
males may matter to population processes.
Rankin and Kokko (2007) ask the question of whether males matter to popu-
lation dynamics, operationally defined as a dependency of population growth on
the relative density of males. They provide simple models, and evaluate the cur-
rent empirical evidence for them, that illustrate various mechanisms of such male
influence: mate searching behavior, male resource use (including effects of sexual
dimorphism), sexual harassment and sexual segregation. In each case, theory pre-
dicts that males can have an effect on population densities, and in some extreme
cases a positive feedback between an increasingly male-biased sex ratio and female
harassment may theoretically even bring about population extinction. Deviations
from monogamy often mean that sexual reproduction can destabilize dynamics
rather than stabilize it (Caswell and Weeks, 1986; Lindstrom and Kokko, 1998).
Unstable dynamics generally occur at high growth rates, and the mixed results on
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stability make sense in the light of the results in Rankin and Kokko (2007): they
generally find that various aspects of male behavior can either promote or hinder
population growth. The results of their study, and the literature reviewed, show
that the males can have a substantial effect on population dynamics, particularly
so when human influences result in biased sex ratios (Rankin and Kokko, 2007).
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CHAPTER 3
BIOECONOMIC MODEL
3.1 The Life Cycle
Rates of birth, growth, maturation, fertility, and mortality describe the movement
of individuals of a species through the life cycle, and are called vital rates (Caswell,
2001). The life cycle is a fundamental unit of description of this process, and a
graphical description of the life cycle is appropriately called a life cycle graph
(LCG). The construction of an LCG proceeds as follows:
1. Choose a set of stages (ie, i -states) in terms of which to describe the life
cycle (these could be stages, age-classes etc).
2. Choose a projection interval, defining the time step in the model. The struc-
ture of the graph and the resulting matrix depends on whether the time
interval (t, t+ 1) represents a day, a week, a year, etc.
3. Create a node for each stage; number the nodes from 1 through s. The order
of the numbering is irrelevant but it is convenient to assign the number 1 to
a stage representing newborn individuals. The symbol Ni denotes node i.
4. Put a directed line or arc from Ni to Nj if an individual in stage i at time
t can contribute individuals (by development or reproduction) to stage j at
time t + 1. If an individual in stage i at time t can contribute to stage i at
t+1 (eg, by remaining in the same stage from one time to the next), put an
arc from Ni to itself; such an arc is called a self loop.
5. Label each arc by a coefficient; coefficient aij on the arc from Ni to Nj gives
the number of individuals in stage j at time t+1 per individual in stage i at
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time t. Thus,
ni(t+ 1) =
s∑
j=1
aijnj(t) (3.1)
Those coefficients may be transition probabilities or reproductive output.
A simple example of an LCG is given in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: A Simple Life Cycle Graph
3.2 Dynamic Matrix Population Models
Studying the life cycle in a demographic context requires a way to translate from
the individual to the population level, and matrix population models provide such
a link. There are two simple rules for converting an LCG to matrix form:
1. If the life-cycle diagram has s nodes, then the corresponding projection ma-
trix is a (s× s) dimension square matrix.
2. If an arc connects node i to node j (where the direction of the arc is from i to
j), then the value of this arc corresponds to the aj,i element of the projection
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matrix A. If there are n directed arcs in the life-cycle diagram, then there
will be n and only n non-zero elements of the projection matrix
Then, the LCG in figure 3.1 will translate to a 4×4 Projection matrix (equation
3.2) with six non-zero elements:
A =

0 0 F3 F4
s1 0 0 0
0 s2 0 0
0 0 s3 s4

(3.2)
A projection matrix describes the probabilities of making a transition between
now and next year (or whatever the projection interval is). In other words, the
probability of moving from (or contributing to) a class of individuals now, to the
another class of individuals next time step. We can see this visually by picturing
each column of the matrix as a from state (ie, individuals will move from or con-
tribute from a given age class) at time (t). The rows are the age classes at the
next time step (t+1), to which individuals are contributed. So, each column is an
age class now, and each row is an age class next time step. The projection matrix
connects the different age classes at each of the 2 time steps. All one needs to do
is ask, what is or are the contributions of a particular age class now to a given
age class next year. If there is a contribution, then this is a non-zero element in
the matrix. If there is no connection, then the corresponding matrix element is 0.
This basic idea is shown schematically in figure 3.2:
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of a Projection Matrix
So, the fertility row consists of contributions from individuals in a particular age
class now to the first age class (babies, for models based on a post-breeding census,
and one year olds for a pre-breeding census). The diagonal is the probability of
moving to the next age class. All of the other elements are 0, because there is no
connection between these age classes.
In matrix notation this may be written as:
n(t+ 1) = An(t) (3.3)
Thus, for our example:
n(t+ 1) =

0 0 F3 F4
s1 0 0 0
0 s2 0 0
0 0 s3 s4


n1
n2
n3
n4

(3.4)
30
The dominant eigenvalue of the projection matrix indicates the rate of pop-
ulation change through time (Caswell, 2001), and by convention is denoted by
λ.
3.3 Two-Sex Models
Most dynamic models include only one sex, usually the female, under the assump-
tions that the sexes are identical or that the population dynamics are determined
by one sex only (eg, female dominance: that population dynamics are determined
by the female vital rates and there are always enough males to fertilize all the
females). Sexual dimorphism in vital rates, such as mortality, age to maturity,
and fecundity is well documented in many species; neither assumption therefore is
generally valid. Demographic sex differences are most pronounced in polygynous
species, where sexual selection has molded the mating system such that small or
otherwise frail males have little chance for conveying genes to the next generation.
Sexual size dimorphism is frequently pushed so far that males have higher mor-
tality risk than females either as juveniles, in adulthood, or both (Lindstrom and
Kokko, 1998; Loison et al., 1999).
Caswell (2001) states that sexual dimorphism and the failure of the dominance
assumption necessitates the inclusion of both sexes in a population projection
model. Consequently, the model is nonlinear because only in a nonlinear model
can reproduction depend on the relative abundance of the sexes (Caswell, 2001).
Despite the substantial research on the evolution of sexual reproduction, there
exist relatively few studies that focus on the consequences of sexual reproduction
or its inclusion in single species population dynamics. This is, to some extent, at
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odds with the knowledge of the complex dynamics displayed by nonlinear systems
elsewhere (Lindstrom and Kokko, 1998). In their most basic form, two-sex models
differ from density-dependent models in that the vital rates depend only on the
relative, not the absolute, abundances of stages in the population (they are some-
times called frequency-dependent for this reason). Such models are necessarily
non-linear (Caswell, 2001).
A simple two-sex LCG is shown in figure 3.3 below. The LCG as depicted is
in z-transformed or reduced form (see Caswell, 2001, chapter 4, chapter 15).
Figure 3.3: Two-sex z-transformed Life Cycle Graph
The exponents (alpha, beta) are there to indicate the number of projection
intervals required to get from one stage to another. They can be used that way
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to write down the characteristic equation, but not to project the population. For
that you need an LCG and matrix that includes all the stages. The dynamics
of this population can be described by a frequency dependent projection matrix
(equation 3.5, for α = 1 and β = 1) that corresponds to the LCG in figure 3.3, and
the projection equation (equation 3.6) may be written in the standard fashion.
An =

0 0 F3 0 F5
ρ 0 0 0 0
0 s2 s3 0 0
1− ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 s4 s5
 (3.5)
n(t+ 1) = Ann(t) (3.6)
The subscript n on A signifies that the projection matrix is dependent on values
of n, ie, A is frequency dependent. In other words each element of A is derived
from a generalized mean of the entries in n:
aij =
kijMijn
nj
(3.7)
3.4 The Birth and Fertility Functions
The fertility functions Fi(n) summarize the demographic interactions between the
sexes. The fertility function is most easily derived from the birth function B(n).
B(n) gives the number of births produced by the population n. Letting nm and
nf denote the number of males and females Caswell (2001) gives the following
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functional forms for some B(n), of which the harmonic mean birth function is
generally regarded as the least flawed (Caswell, 2001):
nf (female dominant)
nm (male dominant)
anm + (1− a)nf (weighted mean)
(nmnf )
1/2 (geometric mean)
2nmnf
nm+nf
(harmonic mean)
min(nm, nf ) (minimum)
The per capita fertility functions Fi(n) are related to the birth function in the
following way:
Fi(n) =
B(n)
2ni
(3.8)
For the harmonic mean birth function, where k is the clutch size, the female
fertility function is:
Ff (n) =
knm
nm + nf
(3.9)
And the male fertility function is:
Fm(n) =
knf
nm + nf
(3.10)
Polygyny is easily incorporated in to the fertility function by introducing a
parameter h, which represents a harem of average size. The harmonic mean birth
function then becomes:
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B(nm, nf ) =
2knmnf
(nm + nfh−1)
(3.11)
h > 1 corresponds to polygyny, h = 1 corresponds to monogamy, and h < 1 to
polyandry (where one female mates with multiple males). Figure 3.4 below shows
the harmonic mean birth function (equation 3.11) as a function of the proportion
of males and the harem size:
Figure 3.4: Harmonic Mean Birth Function for Males with Variable Harem Size
When h = 1, births are maximized when males and females are equally abun-
dant. When h > 1, however, births are maximized when females exceed males.
An analogous relationship may also be seen in the fertility (fecundity) functions)
below.
Thus, the harmonic mean fertility functions in equations 3.13 and 3.10 take the
following form:
Ff (n) =
knm
nm + nfh−1
(3.12)
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Fm(n) =
knf
nm + nfh−1
(3.13)
Figure 3.5 below shows the per capita male and female fecundities derived from
the harmonic mean birth function with variable harem size:
Figure 3.5: Harmonic Mean Per Capita Male and Female Fecundities with Variable
Harem Size
3.5 Competition for Mates
An important factor, that is competition between age/stage classes for mates, was
omitted from equation 3.7. According to equation 3.7, aij is negatively correlated
with the abundance of only one stage (nj). Thus, the per capita production of stage
i by stage j is reduced by competition within stage j, but not by competition with
different stages. Human demographers have criticized birth functions that leave
out competition, because the rate of marriage between males and females of given
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ages depends not only on the relative abundance of those age groups, but on the
abundance of other age groups as well (Caswell, 2001).
To incorporate mate competition in the fertility functions, Fi(n), must include
contributions of all possible combinations of male and female stages. Extending
our two-sex LCG in figure 3.3 to incorporate two additional stage classes for each
sex, a new LCG may be formed as in figure 3.6 below:
Figure 3.6: Two-Sex LCG with Competition Among Stages
Males represented by node 3 and node 4 then compete with each other for
mating opportunities with node 6 and node 7 females. Similarly, node 6 and node
7 females compete with each other for mating opportunities with node 3 and node 4
males. The corresponding projection matrix (equation 3.14) is simply an extension
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of equation 3.5:
An =

0 0 F3 F4 0 F6 F7
ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 s2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 s3 s4 0 0 0
1− ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 s50 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 s6 s7

(3.14)
The fecundity terms in the top row are also modified to reflect competition, for
example the fertility function for node 3 males then becomes:
F3 =
k36M(n3, n6) + k37M(n3, n7)
n3 +D(n4)
(3.15)
Here, k is the clutch size, M is the generalized mean (harmonic mean in this
case) calculated as in equation 3.16
M(ni, nj) =
2ninj
ni + nj
(3.16)
and D is competition parameter that is zero for no competition, and may take
on any value greater than zero to reflect increasing competition between stages.
3.6 Survival
As mentioned earlier entries on the diagonals signify probabilities of moving from
one stage to the next. In biological terms, these are know as survivorship or simply
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survival, and usually vary according to age and sex for any given species. There
are many methods to calculate survival ranging from statistical methods applied
to time-series and/or cross-sectional population data to direct estimation from life
tables. Where data is unavailable, one may turn to published literature for survival
estimates of the species under study or use survival estimates for related/similar
species.
The main question in the context of population modeling and more so for
harvesting species is whether the survival is density dependent (compensatory)
or density independent (additive). Compensatory mortality (survival) is where
hunting mortality is compensated for by a reduction in natural mortality (increase
in survival), ie, it would remove the “doomed surplus” of individuals that would
have succumbed to some other form of mortality such as disease, old age, or natural
predation, resulting in a constant rate of survival despite removal of additional
animals. Additive mortality, on the other hand, is exactly as implied by the name,
adding to the natural mortality, thereby reducing survival proportionately the
hunting or kill rate.
At high population densities, competition for limited resources such as food
and and shelter increases. Therefore, if the population is at or near its natural
carrying capacity, survival is likely to be density dependent and independent if
the population is below its natural carrying capacity (Cooch, 2007). This has
important implications in the context of harvesting species, since a population
below its natural carrying capacity is likely to display density independent survival
and thus, be more vulnerable to harvest. As it approaches its carrying capacity
however, some of form density dependence becomes more likely, and harvest may
be compensatory,
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3.7 Harvest
Harvest is easily incorporated in to either one-sex or two-sex matrix models by
introducing a diagonal matrix having the same dimensions as the projection matrix.
The projection equation may then be written as:
n(t+ 1) = HAn(t) (3.17)
where H is the harvest matrix. All ones on the diagonal mean no harvest,
whereas numbers between zero and one signify harvest. If we wish to model the
harvest of a specific age or sex class, we may keep all numbers as one, and change
only that corresponding to the ages/sex class we want to harvest. In our simple
two-sex example from section 3.3 then:
n(t+ 1) =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0.8 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


0 0 F3 0 F5
ρ 0 0 0 0
0 s2 s3 0 0
1− ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 s4 s5


n1
n2
n3
n4
n5
 (3.18)
The element H3,3 = 0.8 signifies a harvest of 20 percent of node 3 males.
The discussion in the sections above provide us with all the elements needed
to model two-sex population dynamics subject to harvest. The next chapter puts
all these elements together to build and simulate a two-sex population projection
model for a hunted ungulate, the Markhor (Capra falconeri), in Baluchistan, a
western province of Pakistan.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY: TROPHY HUNTING OF MARKHOR IN
PAKISTAN
4.1 Biology of Species
The Markhor (Capra falconeri) is a wild mountain goat and the national animal
of Pakistan. The scientific classification of the Markhor is shown below in table
4.1:
Table 4.1: Scientific Classification of Markhor
Kingdom Animalia
Phylum Chordata
Subphylum Vertebrata
Class Mammalia
Order Artiodactyla
Family Bovidae
Subfamily Caprinae
Genus Capra
Species Capra falconeri
Some literature (Cothran et al. (2005); Ellerman and Morrison-Scott (1951))
documents seven distinct subspecies of Markhor (based on horn shape and size),
five of which are said to occur in Pakistan. Schaller and Khan (1975), however,
disagrees with the classification based on horn shape and size alone and has reduced
the sub-species occurring in Pakistan to two, ie, Capra falconeri falconeri and
Capra falconeri megaceros. The two sub-species not only differ in the basic shape
of their horns, ie, straight and flaring or divergent (see figure 4.1), but also in size
and ruff length. To my knowledge, more recent and accurate genetic techniques
however, have not been applied to wild Markhor populations to determine the
exact number of subspecies.
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(a) C. f. falconeri (b) C. f. Megaceros
Figure 4.1: The two recognized Sub-species of Markhor in Pakistan
“The common name, Markhor, is thought to have either originated from the
Persian words ”mar” and ”khor”, loosely translated as ”snake-eater”, or from the
Pushto words ”mar” and ”akhur”, translated as ”snake-horn”. Several linguistic
camps favor the latter theory, as it seems to refer to the shape of markor horns.
Since the species is entirely vegetarian, it would not make much sense to label it
an eater of snakes” (Cothran et al., 2005).
4.1.1 Geographic Range
Scattered populations of Markhor may be found throughout the arid and steppe
regions of the western Himalayas. Countries of discontinuous distribution are lim-
ited to Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
(Cothran et al., 2005). The species is adapted to mountainous terrain between 600
meters and 3600 meters elevation.
Population densities in Pakistan range from 1 to 9 individuals per square kilo-
meter. The range of such herds is often extremely limited as a result of the moun-
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tainous terrain which Markhors inhabit. A survey by (Schaller and Khan, 1975), in
1975 resulted in one of the more comprehensive data on the status and distribution
of Markhor in Pakistan. See Figure 4.2:
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Markhor, 1975
Since then besides individual unofficial surveys and accounts, the only detailed
data on the distribution and status of the Markhor in Pakistan was carried out
by the IUCN Caprinae Specialist Group in 1999 as part of a world wide survey
on the status of wild sheep and goats and their relatives (Shackelton, Shackelton).
They acknowledge that the distribution map shown in figure 4.2 is still relevant
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today, but the population numbers are almost certain to be less than when Schaller
carried out his study.
4.1.2 Physical Description
Capra falconeri is highly sexually dimorphic in size. Males weigh between 80 and
110 kg, whereas females weigh only 32 to 50 kg. Body length varies between 140
and 180 cm, and the tail may add an additional 8 to 14 cm to the total length.
The relatively short coat of C. falconeri can range in color from light tan to
dark brown, and even black. Capra falconeri differs from Capra ibex in that it lacks
the extremely dense winter underwool possessed by the latter. Fringed beards are
present in both sexes, but are thicker, longer, and more distinct in male markhors
(Cothran et al., 2005).
Light and dark color patterns, typical of all C. falconeri subspecies, are present
on the lower legs. Capra falconeri lacks the knee tufts, inguinal and suborbital
glands present in many species of goats inhabiting mountainous regions. Males and
females both posses extremely bold, flared, corkscrew-like horns. These horns twist
outward and may reach lengths up to 160 cm in males and 24 cm in females. The
angle and direction of horn curvature varies among the subspecies of C. falconeri.
Horn color varies from dark to reddish-brown (Cothran et al., 2005).
Although some might mistake C. falconeri for other members of the genus from
a distance, the horns of markhors make them quite unique in appearance. Northern
populations of C. falconeri can be easily distinguished from Capra aegagrus by the
dorsal crest and lower hanging beard in C. falconeri, as well as the differences in
horn morphology and coloration (Cothran et al., 2005).
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4.1.3 Reproduction
Markhors breed annually. Breeding occurs during fall and winter months. It is
during this time that solitary males may temporarily join female herds. Number
of offspring is 1 to 2 with an average of 1.5. The gestation period is 4.50 to 5.67
months with an average of 5.08 months. Time to weaning is 5 to 6 months (Cothran
et al., 2005).
Female age at sexual or reproductive maturity 18 to 30 months, while male age
at sexual or reproductive maturity is 36 months. Like most ungulates, C. falconeri
is polygynous, where a single male mates with a harem of females. Markhors breed
annually, with males competing aggressively during the rut for the right to sire the
offspring of female herds (Cothran et al., 2005).
Markhors are usually born in the spring and summer months of May and June.
The young are initially born in a shallow earthen hollow. They are able to walk
soon after birth, and can travel with the mother. Mothers provide nourishment
(milk) and protection to their growing young. They stay with the mother for
approximately 6 months, although there are several reports of kids remaining with
the mother thereafter. Males are not reported to participate in parental care
(Cothran et al., 2005).
4.1.4 Lifespan/Longevity
The lifespan of C. falconeri ranges from 11 to 13 years. The species is both
hardy and resilient, and as a result, small herds may be successfully reared and
maintained in captivity (Cothran et al., 2005).
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4.1.5 Conservation Status
C. falconeri is prized among trophy hunters and members of the Asian medicine
market. They face habitat competition from both domestic livestock and local
agriculture. As a result, all populations of feral C. falconeri have been steadily
declining over the past 40 years. C. falconeri was classified as endangered and
conservation-dependant in 1996 by the IUCN, indicating that the long-term sur-
vival of this species is heavily dependent on the initiation and maintenance of
conservation programs (Cothran et al., 2005).
4.2 Calibration of Biological Model
C. falconeri displays both sexual dimorphism and polygyny, (see subsections 4.1.2
and 4.1.3). Since the Markhor’s life span is about 13 years (see subsection 4.1.4
and males older than 6 years are hunted (2.1), I defined a 6-stage-classified model
for both sexes combined, ie, one year olds, two years olds, three year olds, four
year olds, five year olds, and six year olds and greater based on the maximum age
of Markhor reported 4.1.4..
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Figure 4.3: Two Sex Life Cycle Graph
Node 1 represents unborn zygotes whose sex is yet to be determined. Then,
nodes 2 through 7 represent males and 8 through 13 represent females. A self
loop on nodes 7 and 13 means that it represents more than one age class such
that those 6 years old and greater remain in that stage until death. Here, the
resultant 13×13 matrix contains the male and female sex ratio in the first column
where ρ is the male sex ratio. The top row contains male fecundity in the left
and female fecundity in the right. Male survival is then given in the upper left
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quadrant following the first row and first column, and female survival is given in
the lower right quadrant. All other entries are zeros.
The modeling approach was to begin with a deterministic, density-independent
Leslie matrix population model that describes the average demography of the
Markhor population. The matrix entries themselves were derived assuming a birth-
pulse, pre-breeding design. I then examined progressively more complex modeling
scenarios that incorporated regulatory effects as well as a revenue generating linear
demand curve for hunting licenses.
Thus, following from equation 3.6, the population may be projected according
to:
n(t+ 1) =

0 0 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 0 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13
ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 s2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 s3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 s4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 s5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 s6 s7 0 0 0 0 0 0
1− ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s8 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s9 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s10 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s11 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s12 s13


n1
n2
n3
n4
n5
n6
n7
n8
n9
n10
n11
n12
n13

(4.1)
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4.2.1 Parametrization
Direct measures of survival and fecundities for the Markhor are unavailable. How-
ever, they may be approximated by assuming similarities between other mountain
goats. One such study that measures age and sex specific survival in five ungu-
late species was carried out by Loison et al. (1999). Furthermore, Festa-Bianchet
et al. (2003) found that density dependence is unlikely in adult male ungulates,
but survival is more likely a function of age. They do admit however, that males of
dimorphic and polygynous species may show density dependence, and that increas-
ing density may lower overall adult survival in naturally regulated populations but
not in heavily harvested populations where few animals reach senescence. Addi-
tionally, for juveniles, mortality increases at high density (Festa-Bianchet et al.,
2003). Alejandro Gonzalez Voyer (2003) state that hunting mortality appears to
be additive in native populations of ungulates.
Another study of alpine ibex (Jacobson et al., 2004) however, found weak den-
sity dependence in the ibex population, and the Festa-Bianchet et al. (2003) and
Alejandro Gonzalez Voyer (2003) studies did not look at populations at or above
carrying capacity. Clutton-Brock et al. (1997) studied stability and instability in
Soay sheep and Red deer populations, and found that increases in population den-
sity depress both survival and fecundity. The Clutton-Brock et al. (1997) study
used survival functions decreasing in total population for the Soay sheep and Red
deer, and parameterized them using maximum likelihood techniques on detailed
population data collected over twenty years for both species. Unfortunately, such
data is not available for the Markhor in Pakistan, therefore a functional form of
density dependence can not be parameterized in a similar fashion.
I therefore assume a very simple functional form of density dependence-a basic
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threshold model, which is homogenous below the threshold point (ie, survival rates
vary by age but are independent of density up to the threshold point), and is
decreasing in total population above the threshold, and takes the following form
(to approximate one of the representative shapes of density dependent functions
as given in McCullough (1999)):
sit = si − Nt
100001.15
(4.2)
Here, sit is the survival rate of age class i at time t, si is the survival rate of age
class i below the threshold, Nt is the total population at time t, and the carrying
capacity is assumed to be 10000 animals. I varied the exponent on carrying capac-
ity until the simulated population matched the six years of, admittedly not very
good, data ((see Frisina, 2000)) on the Markhor population under consideration
as closely as possible. Validity of such a threshold model may be established by
other studies on ungulate population dynamics, most notably by Clutton-Brock
et al. (1997), which found that survival for a Soay sheep population falls sharply
above a threshold.
The Loison et al. (1999) study found the survival of prime age adults to vary
between 0.85-0.95, with evidence of senescence, ie, decrease in survival for old
aged members of the population. They also found female survival to be higher
than male survival. Estimates of survival for juveniles was assumed to be less
than the minimum survival of prime age adults given, and also more sensitive to
high population density as suggested by Festa-Bianchet et al. (2003). The survival
rates, (s), below the threshold were therefore taken in the range provided by the
Loison et al. (1999) study.
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The fecundities were estimated using the harmonic mean birth function, incor-
porating interstage mate competition and polygyny (see Appendix A for formulas
used to calculate fecundities). Though fecundities are frequency dependent, in un-
gulates they are known to decrease with increasing population density (Clutton-
Brock et al., 1997). This was incorporated by increasing the values for the compe-
tition parameters in the fecundity function for population levels above the assumed
carrying capacity. Both symmetric and asymmetric competition was simulated.
Harem size (hi) was varied according to the age class, assuming larger harems
for older age classes.
The clutch size (ki,j) was taken to be 1 for node 8 (2 year old females) and 1.5
for all other (3 year and older) female nodes (see subsection 4.1.3).
The value for ρ was estimated from the data on one specific Markhor population
in the Torghar area of Pakistan (Frisina, 2000) and taken to be equal to 0.44.
4.2.2 Biological Model Simulation, and Analysis
The initial population vector n(t), was taken from the data given in Frisina (2000).
The population was first projected without density dependent survival, competi-
tion for mates, or harvest, for 100 years (figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Dynamics for Density-Independent Survival and No Competition for
Mates
The total population displays the classical exponential rise and the projected
growth rate converges, after initial oscillations, to a constant value. While the total
population numbers shown in figure 4.4 are not very realistic, the important thing
to note here is the convergence of the projected growth rate. Population growth
is unimpeded for the entire time growth is considered. Left unchecked it would
continue to grow exponentially whenever λ > 1. Thus, exponential population
growth is considered density-independent because abundance does not affect the
rate of population growth. In other words the population converges to a stable
age distribution (SAD), where all age classes eventually grow at the same rate (see
figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: SAD for Density-Independent Survival and No Competition for Mates
Because populations can not grow exponentially forever, as a result of re-
source limitations and other conditions of the environment, the basic exponen-
tial growth model needs to be modified. As already mentioned in the section on
parametrization above, the vital rates will display some form of density depen-
dence. The following figures show simulation results for various combinations of
density-dependent survival and symmetric and asymmetric competition for mates.
Although symmetric competition is unlikely in the real world, it was simulated to
contrast it with, and gain a better understanding of how, asymmetric competition
affects population dynamics.
Thus, the population was then simulated with density dependence but without
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competition for mates or harvest (figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6: Dynamics for Density-Dependent Survival and No Competition for
Mates
The drastic change in dynamics because of density-dependence is obvious. In
fact the population now displays chaotic behavior both in terms of the growth
rate and consequently its abundance. Chaos may be found in almost every kind of
nonlinear ecological model (Caswell, 2001), and the dynamics shown in figure 4.6
show a 2-cycle convergence. The introduction of stage structure in the form of age
classes has been shown to induce population cycles in both discrete-time matrix
models and continuous time models (de Roos and Persson, 2003). Essentially, these
cycles come about through negative feedback mechanisms, in particular density
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dependence that acts on fecundity or survival probabilities (de Roos and Persson,
2003).
The population was then simulated with symmetric competition for mates but
without density dependence or harvest (figure 4.7).
Figure 4.7: Dynamics for Symmetric Competition for Mates and Density-
Independent Survival
Dynamics for symmetric competition and no density-dependence are almost
exactly like those for no competition and no density-dependence, ie, exponential
growth and achievement of an SAD. The main difference between the two is a
slightly lower projected growth rate and less “severe” exponential rise for the sym-
metric competition model. Increased competition (whether symmetric or asym-
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metric) is expected to lower projected growth, therefore the dynamics in 4.7 are
unsurprising.
When symmetric competition for mates and density dependence is combined
however, we again obtain cyclic dynamics as shown in figure 4.8 below:
Figure 4.8: Dynamics for Symmetric Competition for Mates and Density-
Dependent Survival
It is obvious from the figure that the cyclic dynamics are a result of density
dependence as found in the earlier simulation (see 4.6). It takes slightly longer in
this simulation for the dynamics to start cycling however, obviously because the
density dependence does not kick in until the population has reached the carrying
capacity. That is, the projected growth rate and total population show similar
56
dynamics as our model with symmetric competition until the about the sixtieth
year, when it reaches the specified threshold population of ten thousand animals.
The population was then simulated with asymmetric competition for mates but
without density dependence or harvest (figure 4.9).
Figure 4.9: Dynamics for Asymmetric Competition for Mates and Density-
Independent Survival
Asymmetric competition was simulated by making older age classes more com-
petitive in mating than younger ones. The dynamics as seen in figure 4.9 are
relatively stable with respect to the total population. And though the the growth
rate appears to be highly variable, it remains above one, and within a very narrow
range. The abundance therefore shows an exponential-like rise, with occasional
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dips associated with falls in the growth rate.
Finally, the population was simulated with both asymmetric competition for
mates and density dependence (4.10). Thus, for reasons already discussed, this
particular model was assumed to be the one most closely describing the “real”
population dynamics of the Markhor.
Figure 4.10: Dynamics for Asymmetric Competition for Mates and Density-
Dependent Survival
While many populations of large mammals show considerable stability, studies
of several ungulate populations provide evidence of oscillations that vary widely
in regularity and periodicity. Periods of rapid decline followed by recovery have
also been documented in populations of wild sheep, temperate deer, and tropical
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antelope, while persistent instability occurs in several populations of feral sheep
and goats (Clutton-Brock et al., 1997).
Fluctuations in the size of our simulated population are likely a consequence of
density-dependent mortality. Survival falls sharply above a threshold, and different
age classes are affected disproportionately. When population numbers exceed the
carrying capacity and survival is low, recruitment is depressed. To see how we
might stabilize the simulated population, I changed the fecundity and survival
rates in the final model (figure 4.10) to see what affect this would have on the
dynamics. Reducing fecundity and the affect of density-dependence on survival
either individually or simultaneously had the affect of stabilizing the population.
Reducing fecundity had a more stabilizing affect than reducing density-dependence
(see figures 4.11 and 4.12 below).
Figure 4.11: Reduced Fecundity
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Figure 4.12: Reduced Density Dependence
This is in line with our earlier simulations without density dependence and
symmetric competition. Therefore, we can conclude that the cyclic behavior is
caused by the negative feedback mechanisms, in particular density dependence
that acts on fecundity or survival probabilities and cross-cohort competition, as
suggested by de Roos and Persson (2003), Nisbet and Onyiah (1994), and Clutton-
Brock et al. (1997).
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Harvest
The current quota for hunting, set by authorities, for the Markhor population under
consideration, is five males six years old or greater. This translates to less than
one percent of the total estimated population of close to two thousand animals,
and is approximately two percent of the six years old or greater male population.
Harvest may be simulated either as a proportion (percentage) of the population
using the harvest matrix described in the previous chapter, or as a constant. I
simulated trophy harvest for existing quota using both methods and the results
are shown in figures 4.13 and 4.14 below.
Figure 4.13: Growth Rate and Total Population - Two Percent Harvest
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Figure 4.14: Males ≥ 6 years old - Proportional and Constant Harvest
In the density-dependent model with asymmetric competition for mates, nei-
ther proportionate nor constant harvest had any effect on “pattern” of projected
growth dynamics even for harvest rates as high as ninety percent of the targeted
age class. In fact, figures 4.10 and 4.13 are identical. Increasing the harvest rate
had no effect on the population dynamics, suggesting that dynamics are more
dependent on other age classes and/or are perhaps female dominant. This also
suggests, that the current quota of five animals per year is sustainable.
The following figures show results for alternative harvesting strategies, such as
both-sex and multiple age-class harvest.
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Figure 4.15: Females ≥ 6 years old only Harvest
Figure 4.16: Multiple Male Age Class Harvest
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Figure 4.17: Multiple Female Age Class Harvest
Figure 4.18: Both Sex Multiple Age Class Harvest
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Of note are figures 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18, in that population dynamics are altered
in terms of cyclicity in projected growth rate and total abundance. For same-sex
multiple age-class harvest the amplitude of the growth rate remains unchanged
from the no-harvest strategy, but the periodicity increases for males and decreases
when females are targeted.
When multiple age-classes of both sexes are harvested, the dynamics appear to
become more random and chaotic, though of note is the amplitude of the projected
growth rate, which decreases in contrast to the no-harvest strategy. The total
population however, persists significantly below the carrying capacity, as compared
to the other harvest strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC ASPECTS
The purpose of this chapter is to assess, by means of a literature review of
auction theory and monopoly pricing, whether the existing delivery mechanism is
optimal for the sale of permits, or whether there is an alternative mechanism(s)
that might be better. An optimal mechanism is defined as one which maximizes
the seller’s expected revenues.
5.1 Auction Theory
Four basic types of auctions are widely used and analyzed:
1. In the ascending auction, the price is successively raised until only one bidder
remains, and that bidder wins the object at the final price. This auction can
be run by having the seller announce prices, or by having the bidders call out
prices themselves, or by having bids submitted electronically with the best
current bid posted.
2. The descending auction works in exactly the opposite way: the auctioneer
starts at a very high price, and then lowers the price continuously. The first
bidder who calls out that she accept the current price wins the object at that
price.
3. In the first-price sealed-bid auction each bidder independently submits a
single bid, without seeing others’ bids, and the object is sold to the bidder
who makes the highest bid. The winner pays her bid, ie, the price is the
highest or “first” price bid.
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4. In the second-price sealed-bid auction (also called a Vickrey auction), also,
each bidder independently submits a single bid, without seeing others’ bids,
and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. However,
the price she pays is the second-highest bidder’s bid, or “second” price.
Furthermore, there are two basic models of auctions: the private-value model, in
which each bidder knows how much she values the object(s) for sale, but her value
is private information to herself; in the pure common-value model, by contrast, the
actual value is the same for everyone, but bidders have different private information
about what that value actually is. With private values, in the ascending auction,
the dominant strategy is to stay in the bidding until the price reaches your value,
that is, until you are just indifferent between winning and not winning. The next-
to-last person will drop out when her value is reached, so the person with the
highest value will win at a price equal to the value of the second-highest bidder.
Furthermore, Klemperer (2004) states that a second-price sealed-bid private-values
auction is analogous to the ascending auction in that the person with the highest
value will win at a price equal to the value of the second-highest. Here however,
“truth telling” is a dominant strategy, that is it is optimal for a player to bid her
true value, whatever other players do (Klemperer, 2004).
A key result in auction theory is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET):
Assume each of a given number of risk-neutral buyers of an object has a privately
known signal independently drawn from a common, strictly increasing, atomless
distribution. Then any auction mechanism in which (i) the object always goes to
the buyer with the highest signal, and (ii) any bidder with the lowest-feasible signal
expects zero surplus, yields the same expected revenue (and results in each bidder
making the same expected payment as a function of her signal). Thus, the RET
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tells us that the seller can expect equal profits on average from all standard (and
many non-standard) types of auctions, and that buyers are also indifferent among
them all.
Much of auction theory can be understood in the terms of this theorem, and
how its results are affected by relaxing its assumptions of: (i) a fixed number; (ii)
of symmetric; (iii) risk-neutral bidders; (iv) who each want a single unit; (v) have
independent information; (vi) and bid independently (Klemperer, 2004). Myer-
son (1981) shows how to derive optimal auctions (ie, auctions that maximize the
seller’s expected revenue) when the assumption of symmetry fails. Maskin and
Riley (1984) consider the case of risk-averse bidders, in which case the first-price
sealed-bid auction is the most profitable of the standard auctions. Milgrom and
Weber (1982) analyzed auctions when the assumption of independent information
is replaced by one of affiliated information (ie, if one bidder has more optimistic
information about the value of the prize, it is likely that other bidders’ information
will also be optimistic), and showed that the most profitable standard auction is
then the ascending auction.
“For practical auction design, it is probably most important to remove the
assumptions that the number of bidders is unaffected by the auction design, and
that the bidders necessarily bid independently of each other; the sealed-bid designs
frequently (but not always) both attract a larger number of bidders and are bet-
ter at discouraging collusion than are ascending designs” (Klemperer, 2004). For
practical auctions design Klemperer (2004) suggests that a good auction needs to
be tailored to the specific details of the situation, and that encouraging entry and
discouraging collusion are the most critical issues to consider (Klemperer, 2004).
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There is also a close analogy between the theory of optimal auctions and that
of monopoly pricing; “the analysis of optimal auctions is essentially equivalent to
the analysis of standard monopoly third-degree price discrimination” (Bulow and
Roberts, 1989). The auction problem can therefore be understood by applying the
usual logic of marginal revenue versus marginal cost. Bulow and Roberts (1989)
show that under the assumptions of the RET the expected revenue from an auction
equals the expected marginal revenue of the winning bidder(s).
So in an optimal auction the objects are allocated to the bidders with the high-
est marginal revenues, just as a price-discriminating monopolist sells to the buyers
with the highest marginal revenues (by equalizing the lowest marginal revenues
sold to across different markets). And just as a monopolist should not sell below
the price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, so an auctioneer should not
sell below a reserve price set equal to the value of the bidder whose marginal rev-
enue equals the value to the auctioneer of retaining the unit. The marginal revenue
should be set equal to zero if the auctioneer, or monopolist, is simply maximizing
revenues. Under the assumptions of the RET, and if bidders with higher signals
have higher marginal revenues, all the standard auctions are optimal if the seller
imposes the optimal reserve price (Klemperer, 2004).
5.2 Assessment and Recommendations for Pakistan’s
Mechanism
The following assessment is based primarily on a paper by Harris and Raviv (1981),
who derive the form of an optimal marketing scheme in the context of a monopolis-
tic seller, producing a homogenous product, with and without capacity limitations.
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They assume unit demand for any price at or below a buyer’s reservation price.1
They also assume buyers are identical except for their reservation price and asym-
metric (ie, each buyer knows her known reservation price and not that of any
other).2
Their model closely matches that for the sale of hunting permits by the
Balochistan wildlife department. That is, the wildlife department is the monopo-
listic seller producing hunting permits (homogenous product), with an exogenous
capacity limit. The capacity limit is considered exogenous because it is dependent
on the Markhor population that is obviously not determined (at least not com-
pletely) by the department (or anyone else). I assume that the individual demand
for permits is unit, largely because of hunters’ characteristics. That is most hunters
interested in such expensive and rare trophies usually desire just one, because of
(i) the cost, and (ii) the value of a second trophy declines significantly once one is
obtained.
Clearly, if the department had complete information about the reservation price
of each bidder, it would be optimal for it to sell one unit each to buyers with the
highest reservation price and to charge each buyer her true reservation price (ie,
perfect price discrimination). In the absence of such complete information, it
is not possible to perfectly discriminate, but is possible to discriminate to some
extent (Harris and Raviv, 1981). Harris and Raviv (1981) show that there are
two optimal pricing schemes when the available quantity of the object (hunting
permits) is exogenously determined, and less than the number of potential bidders.
1It must be clarified that this unit demand is an individual bidder’s demand, and not the
combined (or market) demand for permits.
2The authors also apply the revelation principle to the mechanisms, implying direct and
truthful schemes. They define a direct scheme as one in which each buyer writes down a bid or
declared price without knowing what other buyers are writing. A truthful scheme is defined as
an direct scheme in which the buyer’s optimal strategy is to declare her true reservation value,
given that all other buyers are also declaring their true reservation values.
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First, they prove that a “priority pricing” scheme is optimal for all parameters
of their model. Such a scheme is one in which the seller announces a schedule of
prices, and each potential buyer chooses a priority price, which she is willing to pay.
The key point here is that buyers choosing higher prices expect and must receive a
better “version” of the product. For example, electricity and natural gas is sold to
some industrial customers using a priority pricing scheme, and customers paying
lower prices are cut off before those paying higher prices in times of shortage. Since
the hunting permits are homogeneous, the priority pricing scheme will only be
feasible and optimal for the department if it can somehow convert a homogeneous
product in to a heterogenous one. This is not as difficult as it may seem. For
example, hunters choosing higher prices may be given first-access to the hunting
area , ie, the highest bidder be given first access, the second highest second access,
and so on. The higher bidders may also be given more days to complete their
hunt. Thirdly, if the hunt is unsuccessful because a hunters missed her shot, the
higher bidders may be given a refund or a return opportunity, that is currently
denied under the existing mechanism. Thus, a seemingly homogenous product can
be made heterogenous in order to successfully apply a priority pricing scheme.
Second, Harris and Raviv (1981) also prove the optimality of a common price
auction with minimum acceptable bid, which they call a Modified Vickrey Auc-
tion. The modified auction differs from the Vickrey auction in two ways. First, it
includes a minimum acceptable bid, and second, the discreteness of the possible
reservation prices is exploited by sometimes setting the price above the highest
rejected bid. They show that the such an auction is not always feasible3, but is
always optimal when it is feasible.
3In some cases, the conditions applied to this mechanism require a successful bidder to pay
more than her endowment, which is obviously not possible, and therefore not feasible.
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In addition to an exogenous capacity limit, Harris and Raviv (1981) consider
the case where capacity may be endogenously determined. For the Balochistan
wildlife department this is a possibility if population numbers are significantly
high. In such a case, they show that if increasing capacity is costless, then choosing
capacity equal to the potential demand and setting a single price is optimal. For
the Markhor, this increase in capacity is equivalent to the hunting of a greater
number of animals, and this my be viewed as a cost if this negatively affects
their population dynamics. Thus, Harris and Raviv (1981) state that if increasing
capacity is at all costly, then setting capacity to be less than potential demand
and using priority pricing or the modified Vickrey auction are optimal.
Based on the review above, I would recommend a change in the delivery mecha-
nism from a first-price sealed-bid auction to either the priority-pricing or modified
Vickrey auction. Additional advantages of a modified Vickrey auction (and other
sealed-bid auctions) are that such auctions are generally more attractive to en-
trants. Furthermore, the Vickrey auction, because it encourages “truth-telling”
(buyers will state their true values as a dominant strategy), will not discourage
potential bidders who have only small amounts to trade (Klemperer, 2004).
Though the problem of collusion is unlikely since the bids are submitted by
both national and international hunters from all over the world, thus for all to
collude would take considerable resources and organizational ability, which is highly
unlikely. Collusion is usually harder in sealed-bid auctions than ascending auctions
in any case (Klemperer, 2004). Lastly, though I assumed private-values, in the
common values case in which bidders have similar actual value for a prize, the
“winners curse”4 problem for a weaker bidder is far less severe in a sealed-bid
auction.
4In short, the winner’s curse says that in such an auction, the winner will tend to overpay.
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5.3 Complete Information
In this section I carry out an analysis of the optimal strategy and resultant pop-
ulation dynamics in the presence of complete information that would allow the
wildlife department to discriminate perfectly. I assume zero marginal costs and
a downward sloping linear demand curve. Varying the slope changes the static
revenue maximizing quota, which, if the demand curve is given by p(q) = a − bq,
is calculated as q = a
2b
. I assumed that quantity demanded would fall to zero if
permits were priced at ≥ $100, 000.
The slope of the demand curve is directly related to the concept of price elas-
ticity of demand, which may be written mathematically as:
η =
∣∣∣∣∣
δq
q
δp
p
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.1)
The inverse of the price elasticity of demand, ie, the flexibility of price to
changes in quantity is then:
f =
∣∣∣∣∣
δp
p
δq
q
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1η (5.2)
Figures 5.1 to 5.8 below show the revenue maximizing quota and revenues
from varying the slope of the demand curve. The harvest dynamics (for both
proportional and constant harvest) of ≥ 6 year old males corresponding to the
revenue maximizing quota is also shown. Based on the analysis in the following
figures therefore, in order to maximize realized revenues, the monopolist should
set a larger quota if f < 1 (η > 1), and a smaller quota if f > 1 (η < 1).
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Figure 5.1: Perfect Price Discrimination A
Figure 5.2: Dynamics with a harvest of 50 (18%) of ≥ 6
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Figure 5.3: Perfect Price Discrimination B
Figure 5.4: Dynamics with a harvest of 10 (4%) of ≥ 6
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Figure 5.5: Perfect Price Discrimination C
Figure 5.6: Dynamics with a harvest of 5 (2%) of ≥ 6
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Figure 5.7: Perfect Price Discrimination D
Figure 5.8: Dynamics with a harvest of 2 (1%) of ≥ 6
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As mentioned in section 4.2.2, harvest of up to ninety percent of the ≥ 6 years
old males does not affect the overall population dynamics of the Markhor. There-
fore, at first it appears that all the revenue maximizing quota levels derived above
are biologically sustainable. However, as mentioned in 2.1.2, there are negative
evolutionary consequences of trophy hunting such as reduced horn sizes and body
weight resulting from hunting the largest trophies trophies. Shackelton (2001)
states “evidence suggests that in the short term, there are few if any negative ef-
fects of trophy hunting, which is to be expected if the majority of mature males
are not hunted. What is unknown however, is the long-term genetic impact of
this activity, because trophy hunting removes what are most probably the genet-
ically superior individuals from a population”. Again, the impact will likely be
minimized if only a fraction of the mature trophy males are taken each year.
Thus, if the wildlife department has complete information about hunters’ reser-
vation prices, and can construct a market demand curve from individual prefer-
ences, it is possible to perfectly discriminate amongst the hunters and maximize
revenue. However, the quota allocation decision has to be made in combination
with theory and models from population and evolutionary biology in order to en-
sure sustainability.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this thesis was to model and simulate two-sex population
dynamics, with harvest, in order to assess the conditions under which harvest might
be biologically sustainable. It was also an an attempt at addressing some of the
criticisms of bio-economic models by considering ecological complexity in a revenue
maximizing trophy harvest model. Prior to my research, it was not clear how
trophy hunting of a small percentage of mature adult males affected the population
dynamics of the Markhor population in western Pakistan. Anecdotal evidence
seemed to suggest that the population was not adversely affected. My research
therefore, based on a more scientific analysis, was aimed at either bolstering that
view or negating it. As it turned out, the anecdotal evidence holds up in the face
of my research on the population dynamics of the trophy hunted Markhor.
The main questions I had hoped to answer were:
1. Are current recommendations of a 2 to 5 percent offtake biologically sustain-
able?
2. Is targeting a specific age or sex class biologically sustainable?
3. What combination of permit price and quota allocation maximizes revenue,
and under what conditions?
4. What is the optimal delivery mechanism for the sale of hunting permits?
Given the structure of the biological model, a 2 to 5 percent offtake is biolog-
ically sustainable. In fact, an even higher offtake, at first glance, appears not to
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alter population dynamics. The model also demonstrated that a certain percent-
age of female offtake and/or multiple age classes may also be harvested without
significantly altering population dynamics.
It is noteworthy that management options usually include targeting males, both
because of their larger size and potential for trophy hunting, and for the sake of
sparing females to produce young. But Rankin and Kokko (2007) suggest that
“such a management strategy may push the sex ratio at which maximal offspring
production occurs very close to the threshold under which females become unable
to find a mate, reducing the population density to dangerously low levels”, such
as in the Saiga antelope. There are many instances where the removal of males
appears to have little effect on population persistence, indicated by examples such
as extreme sex ratio bias in the face of male killing, or the simple observation
that populations subjected to selective harvesting of males can be sustainable if
it is not excessive. However, persistence does not mean that population growth
has not been impacted, and a dearth of males may cause a reduction in average
female fecundity (Rankin and Kokko, 2007). Additionally, the loss of genetically
superior animals (ie, larger horn size is not just age related, but also implies greater
fitness), and the negative evolutionary consequences associated with this must be
taken into account when devising harvest management strategies.
In the absence of complete information, it was shown that the existing delivery
mechanism (ie, a first-price sealed-bid auction), with capacity limitations that
are exogenously determined, is not optimal. A priority pricing or second-price
sealed bid auction are more likely to maximize the wildlife department’s expected
revenues.
In the presence of complete information however, we assume we know each
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potential bidder’s reserve price, and therefore charging each bidder her reserve
price would be optimal (ie, perfect-price discrimination). In order to maximize
realized revenues in such a case, the monopolist should set a larger quota if f < 1
(η > 1), and a smaller quota if f > 1 (η < 1) (see equations 5.1 and 5.2). Without
knowing the functional form of the demand curve for hunting permits however,
it is difficult to conjecture what specific combination of permit price and quota
allocation would maximize revenue. An accurate estimation of this relationship
was beyond the scope of this thesis, but would be a topic for future research.
This may be done by collecting information on the value and number of bids
submitted, as well as questionnaires designed to elicit the hunters’ willingness to
pay for permits, which could help in applying contingent valuation techniques to
estimate the demand for permits.
The paper has also pointed out the necessity of certain data for an accurate
application of the model. The vital rates in particular, should ideally be estimated
from long-term data for the specific species being simulated, as opposed to inferring
them from similar species. In addition, the functional form of the model used in
this thesis treated the entire population as one single herd. Data on specific herds,
and dispersal among herds would enable a more accurate dispersal model to be
formulated. Incorporating data on weather, forage availability, and the introduc-
tion of a stochastic component to capture random drift would also bring the model
closer to mimicking the actual conditions facing the population of the Markhor,
and would likely be more accurate in simulating the population dynamics.
It is hoped that the methods and model developed in this thesis may be used by
planners and managers as a framework to make quota allocation and permit pricing
decisions while maintaining sustainable harvest programs for various species. It is
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also hoped that this thesis will serve as a guide for data collection needs for an
accurate prediction of the impact of trophy hunting on population dynamics.
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APPENDIX A
FORMULAS
Fecundity:
F4 =
(k49M(n4, n9)h
−1
9 ) + (k410M(n4, n10)h
−1
10 )
n4 +D1(n5 + n6 + n7)
+
(k411M(n4, n11)h
−1
11 ) + (k412M(n4, n12)h
−1
12 )
n4 +D1(n5 + n6 + n7)
+
(k413M(n4, n13)h
−1
13 )
n4 +D1(n5 + n6 + n7)
(A.1)
F5 =
(k59M(n5, n9)h
−1
9 ) + (k510M(n5, n10)h
−1
10 )
n5 +D2(n4 + n6 + n7)
+
(k511M(n5, n11)h
−1
11 ) + (k512M(n5, n12)h
−1
12 )
n5 +D2(n4 + n6 + n7)
+
(k513M(n5, n13)h
−1
13 )
n5 +D2(n4 + n6 + n7)
(A.2)
F6 =
(k69M(n6, n9)h
−1
9 ) + (k610M(n6, n10)h
−1
10 )
n6 +D3(n4 + n5 + n7)
+
(k611M(n6, n11)h
−1
11 ) + (k612M(n6, n12)h
−1
12 )
n6 +D3(n4 + n5 + n7)
+
(k613M(n6, n13)h
−1
13 )
n6 +D3(n4 + n5 + n7)
(A.3)
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F7 =
(k79M(n7, n9)h
−1
9 ) + (k710M(n7, n10)h
−1
10 )
n7 +D4(n4 + n5 + n6)
+
(k711M(n7, n11)h
−1
11 ) + (k712M(n7, n12)h
−1
12 )
n7 +D4(n4 + n5 + n6)
+
(k713M(n7, n13)h
−1
13 )
n7 +D4(n4 + n5 + n6)
(A.4)
F9 =
k49M(n4, n9) + k59M(n5, n9)
n9h
−1
9 +D5(n10 + n11 + n12 + n13)
+
k69M(n6, n9) + k79M(n7, n9)
n9h
−1
9 +D5(n10 + n11 + n12 + n13)
(A.5)
F10 =
k410M(n4, n10) + k510M(n5, n10)
n10h
−1
10 +D6(n9 + n11 + n12 + n13)
+
k610M(n6, n10) + k710M(n7, n10)
n10h
−1
10 +D6(n9 + n11 + n12 + n13)
(A.6)
F11 =
k411M(n4, n11) + k511M(n5, n11)
n11h
−1
11 +D7(n9 + n10 + n12 + n13)
+
k611M(n6, n11) + k711M(n7, n11)
n11h
−1
11 +D7(n9 + n10 + n12 + n13)
(A.7)
F12 =
k412M(n4, n12) + k512M(n5, n12)
n12h
−1
12 +D8(n9 + n10 + n11 + n13)
+
k612M(n6, n12) + k712M(n7, n12)
n12h
−1
12 +D8(n9 + n10 + n11 + n13)
(A.8)
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F13 =
k413M(n4, n13) + k513M(n5, n13)
n13h
−1
13 +D9(n9 + n10 + n11 + n12)
+
k613M(n6, n13) + k713M(n7, n13)
n13h
−1
13 +D9(n9 + n10 + n11 + n12)
(A.9)
Where,
M(ni, nj) =
2ninj
ni + nj
(A.10)
hi represents harem size and is used to incorporate polygyny in to the model.
For monogamous mating systems, this may simply be dropped from the fecundity
equations above.
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